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Abstract 
While social policies in the past are “by other means” if compared to traditional welfare 
states, historians have successfully established that they were much more conventional in their 
own time. Moreover, welfare states are historically grown constructs often still containing 
many pre-existing elements of precisely such social policies by other means, for example non-
state provision. Belgium is an excellent example. Historically both nineteenth-century poor 
relief and early-twentieth-century social insurance were mixed private/public forms of 
provision and funding. Today the Belgian welfare state still retains fundamental aspects of 
non-state provision not usually associated with “conventional” welfare states in the core 
OECD.  
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A side effect of the firm establishment of the welfare state in post-war Europe and the related 
“welfare consensus” was that it implied a rather narrow understanding of social policy, 
leaving little attention for social policy by other means. Many historians focused merely on 
state welfare and the introduction of social insurance legislation, neglecting earlier systems of 
public poor relief or implying a firm cleavage between “a tale of the Poor Law which breaks 
off somewhere in the late nineteenth century, and the ‘rise of the Welfare State’ from the 
1870s on in which the emergence of State institutions is traced without reference to the Poor 
Law past” (Thomson 1986: 373).  
Today it is widely agreed that the origins of the modern welfare state are to be found not only 
in social insurance legislation, but at least as much in systems of poor relief that existed long 
before it. Even in the case of Germany, most famous for its Bismarckian social insurance 
legislation in the 1880s as the example par excellence of the “early” welfare state, Stolleis 
(2013: 25) convincingly argued that “older forms of safety merged into this new system, and 
not only as relics, but possibly also as the potential for future social policy”. Since the 1990s 
historians have successfully established that social policies often constituted a “mixed 
economy of social welfare” (Katz and Sachsse 1996, Harris and Bridgen 2007) involving 
different mixed private/public forms of provision. Van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) made 
important contributions not only by bringing in the role of religion in general and Christian 
Democracy and Catholic social thought in specific, but also by emphasizing that social policy 
was one of the decisive battlefields for the “culture wars” between liberalism and the Church 
(Van Kersbergen 2011). Ansell and Lindval (2013), too, recently studied late-nineteenth-
century mixed private/public educational policies and pointed out the role of 
interdenominational struggle and ideology. Like these recent endeavours, this contribution 
explains the private/public intertwinement of social policies in the nineteenth century and 
their part in how today’s welfare state looks like. Studying the case of Belgium will make it 
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clear that some of the traits of non-state provision already apparent in early nineteenth-century 
poor relief still mark today’s Belgian welfare state. The Belgian case was not explored in full 
in van Kerbergen and Manow’s multinational volume (2009) and even Belgian historiography 
has largely lacked such a perspective, except for some notable exceptions such as Lis and 
Vanthemsche (1995). 
This contribution’s comparative approach thus lies in reflecting on the continuity (and 
change) in social policies in Belgium, more particularly poor relief and social insurance, from 
a historical perspective. A first, theoretical part will add historical perspective to what 
Seelkopf and Starke in their introduction called “theorizing unconventional forms of welfare 
production”. Then, the empirical part gives a clear historical view of two main branches of 
social policy in nineteenth-century Belgium: the mixed private/public system of poor relief 
from the early-nineteenth century onwards and the provision of social insurances by mutual-
aid societies (whose members paid to insure themselves against, among others, sickness and 
invalidity) and their incorporation in the national social insurance policy around the turn of 
the century in what became known as the system of “subsidized liberty”. Explaining the 
continuity between the ways in which these social policies were constructed is the subject of 
the explanatory, third part of this contribution.  
1. Theorizing social policy by other means: social provision and regulation before the 
welfare state  
According to Orloff  (2005: 196) “the term ‘welfare state’ has functioned as an accepted, if 
often anachronistic, shorthand for systems of social provision and regulation in the developed 
capitalist world.” Our understanding of pre-welfare state social policies indeed gains more by 
considering social policy as a system of social provision and regulation rather than when such 
policies are seen merely as precursor of the welfare state. From a historical point of view, 
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looking to social policy from the point of view of today’s welfare state overemphasizes not 
only 1) state provision (as compared to non-state provision) but also 2) the involvement of 
national government (as compared to local governments) and 3) social transfers and direct 
provision (as compared to regulation). 
To begin with the third observation, social policy not only consists of organizing specific 
services to counter social needs (provision), but it also encompasses the framework of 
regulations and conditions within which these services can be organized in a consistent way 
(regulation). If social policy may be said to be a painting, then social regulation is the frame 
of the painting and social provision the painting itself. The painting can only be painted 
within the boundaries of the frame within which it takes shape. Therefore, speaking of 
systems of social provision and regulation is just “to underline that benefits are never 
delivered without some sort of discipline, regulation, or categorization” (Orloff 2005: 199). 
Skocpol and Amenta (1986: 132) essentially meant the same when they said to “think of 
social policies as coming into prominence” the moment when “state organized or regulated 
mass education,” and made “efforts to regulate industrial working conditions and 
environmental influences on people’s health.” 
For the largest part of the nineteenth-century, the national state in Belgium mostly served as a 
regulating power in the social field, and was not (directly) involved in its organization. Actual 
social provision was a responsibility of local governments, but largely depended on private 
welfare providers such as religious institutes and philanthropic societies, leading to various 
types of private/public cooperation. Therefore, following the first and second observation, the 
nineteenth-century context was one in which non-state provision and local government 
responsibility, within the framework of national regulation, were very conventional. In this 
context, the less visible social regulation by the state was proportionally even more important 
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in shaping social policy than in a system of full state provision (see also Ramesh and Bali’s 
contribution). 
Disregarding these three observations may lead to the oft-used but short-sighted image of the 
nineteenth-century state as an impotent “night watchman”. This metaphor has been persistent 
in the general image of the nineteenth century as well as in the literature to date (for example 
Art 2004). Van der Linden (1996: 34) distinguished between the state’s “passive behaviour” 
in the nineteenth century and its “much more active” behaviour from the end of that century 
onwards, defining “passive behaviour” as follows: “the state did not wish to organize social 
insurance itself and therefore left this responsibility to other institutions and provided 
supervisory guidance at most”. This understanding of the state’s responsibility was clearly 
measured by the modern standard of the state organizing social insurance itself. However, if 
measured using the contemporary context, the state’s role was arguably much less passive 
than van der Linden assumed. Katz and Sachsse (1996: 15) discarded the image of a “passive 
state”, asserting that from the early nineteenth century many governments “began to assume 
new responsibilities in areas such as education, mental illness, public health, and crime”. Van 
Damme (1991: 449) rightly called it “a period in which the state developed an enormous 
administrative capacity regarding the management and regulation of social phenomena”. The 
ultimate point is that the tendency to depict nineteenth-century policy as that of a “night 
watchman” is “largely because such [nineteenth-century] interventionism took rather different 
political and bureaucratic forms from those that they were familiar with a hundred years later” 
(Harris 1996: 52). Even in the period of the allegedly “much more active” state, social policy 
retained much of the “passive behaviour”, in that social insurance was still not provided by 
the state itself. 
Rather than a linear evolution between two clear-cut points and policies, “the development of 
the early welfare state must be seen as a slow, often changeable evolution on the mid-long-
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term, as a process of trial and error” (Van Praet 2015: 20) or as shifts and combinations within 
the “Bermuda Triangle of welfare, constituted by the collective (society or state), 
intermediary organizations (communities, voluntary associations, self-help groups), and the 
individual” (Frankenberg 1996: 77). It downplays the clear-cut distinction, shows how what 
we call “modernity” bore the marks of “tradition” and indeed effectuated a long-lasting 
continuity. And in that gradual and non-linear evolution, many aspects characterizing this 
historical form of social policy by other means even survived in the more formalized 
twentieth-century social policy.  
2. State, society and social policies in Belgium between 1800 and 1920 
Nineteenth-century Belgium was deeply affected by French revolutionary and Napoleonic 
legislation. The French revolutionaries annexed the Southern Netherlands (Belgium to-be) in 
the 1790s, confiscated all religious properties and imposed their own reorganisation of the 
poor relief system. Two distinct administrative public institutions, both under municipal 
supervision, were set up: Welfare Offices  for the organization of homecare and Commissions 
for Civil Hospices for the management of all the (confiscated) hospitals and other care 
institutions. Testifying to Napoleon’s pragmatic politics was a 1809 decree that allowed 
female religious to again work as nurses in what were now public hospitals (the religious’s 
own institutions before), even granting these religious institutes legal personality. This decree 
remained largely in force throughout the nineteenth century.  
Much of this legislation survived the Belgian revolution of 1830. The Catholic clergy, the 
nobility and a group of young liberals had joined forces against the Dutch King Willem I and 
seized power under the heading of “unionism”. The 1831 Constitution and the municipal and 
provincial laws of 1836 completed the parliamentary monarchy’s multilevel governance. 
After the traumatic experiences of a French Revolution that had banished religious institutes, 
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the Catholics were awarded the constitutional liberties of religion, association and education. 
This enabled the Church to develop its wide network of educational and charitable 
institutions. Liberals, on the other hand, were given their way with the freedom of opinion and 
press. Despite their initial “unionist” agreement in national politics, however, tensions 
between Catholics and liberals mounted from the 1850s onwards, occupying much of politics 
until the social question (and with it the socialist movement) emerged in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. 
2.1. Mixed private/public arrangements in nineteenth-century poor relief (1800-
1920) 
Nineteenth-century poor relief in Belgium was a local matter, and it increasingly relied on 
private, mostly Catholic, institutions. Although the French revolutionaries had dealt a serious 
blow to Catholic charity by confiscating its property and bringing its institutions under the 
supervision of the public Commissions, in early Belgium religious institutes were allowed to 
take back their old positions and found new institutions. An impressive boost in new 
foundations between 1830 and 1860 made the Catholic network of hospitals, specialized 
institutions, and schools flourish (Van Dijck and Suenens 2008). The public and the private 
sector were not however two separate circuits existing alongside each other, they were 
essentially intertwined (Van Molle and De Maeyer 2013) . Depending on the nature of the 
institution and its location, these local mixed private/public arrangements took different 
forms. By ranking them on a scale from more publicly to more autonomously organized (all 
four of them in between the fully public and the fully private institutions), I distinguish 
between four types (see Table 1).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
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The first two types of institutions always existed, at least officially, within the public system. 
In the “employment” type, public hospitals in large cities owned by the Commission 
employed religious institutes for the daily care of the hospitalized. The female religious, 
whose number and tasks were strictly determined, figured on the Commission’s payroll, and 
while the mother-superior sometimes still served in the early years as director, the women 
religious had little or no say in the overall management. However, the position in the public 
hospitals offered many advantages: the commission supplied room and board, a regular 
salary, a pension and additional material advantages. In the case of specialized urban 
institutions, or hospitals in the countryside, the Commission often used the model of an 
“invitation” where the management de jure lay with them, but de facto was left to a religious 
institute. Viaene (2001: 177) called this “an empire by invitation”: public poor relief invited 
private charity actors to take on duties that actually fell under public responsibility. In this 
sense it also closely relates to the “delegated governance” that Morgan and Campbell (2011) 
have addressed in modern welfare regimes. Specifically, this invitation type implied that the 
Commission was not directly responsible for the expenses, but that it agreed on a price with 
its “contractors”. Despite the sometimes far-reaching autonomy unique to this model, the 
“entrepreneurs” often found themselves in the most subservient positions. In practice, 
autonomy meant that the religious institutes themselves bore the entire risk of management 
and their institutions had to fight to financially stay above water.  
Structural intertwining with private charity also came about in places where the institutions 
were not officially part of the public system’s legal framework. The third type involved 
private institutions that had independent management, but often with a structural dependence 
on the municipality, Commission or Welfare Office for direct material or financial support. 
These were often non-religious, philanthropic associations, but many religious institutes 
specializing in free home care qualified as well. The support varied widely: the use of a 
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house, support in kind and/or direct subsidies. In 1858, private institutions received a total of 
nearly BEF 40,000 in subsidies from the Belgian Welfare Offices (National State Archives 
[1862]). Although it was only a fraction of their total expenditure (never more than 0.5 per 
cent), of which the biggest part went to home care, this was a considerable amount of subsidy 
for those days. Admittedly, it is difficult to weigh these numbers because of the structural 
private/public entanglement in the sources, which is in itself a notable observation. 
Even where institutions operated fully independently, they could be employed in the public 
system by admitting patients at the expense of the Commission or the Welfare Office. In this 
fourth type, the “placement” procedure, the private institution and the Commission agreed 
on a daily rate per patient and a maximum number of patients, an arrangement proving 
attractive for both parties. The Commission did not have to establish its own hospital and 
could negotiate a daily rate relatively lower than the amount charged to the institution’s 
paying patients. The institution itself enjoyed a stable source of income and still retained its 
full autonomy. Placements were a widespread phenomenon in the countryside and were 
organized by the Welfare Office in municipalities that did not have any hospitals and hence 
no Commission.1  In 1858 the share of private hospitals in the reimbursed placement costs 
still accounted for about one-third of the nearly BEF 140,000 that Welfare Offices spent on 
placements in hospitals (National State Archives [1862]). Even in spite of a growing share of 
public hospitals, it should be kept in mind that many hospitals in the countryside while 
officially public were run by private actors following the “invitation” type. The Welfare 
Offices also spent BEF 5,000 and over BEF 67,000 for placements in institutes for the deaf-
mute (all private) and psychiatric asylums (43 of the 59 private) (Lentz 1866). 
The four types co-existed throughout the nineteenth century and even into the twentieth 
century. Only the “invitation” type became less common due to the political and ideological 
                                                             
1 In 1856, Belgium had around 2,500 Welfare Offices but only 174 Commissions (Lentz 1866).  
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sensitivity following the “culture wars” in the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as 
some forms of the “support” type, especially, direct subsidies to religious institutes. But the 
“employment” and “placement” types proved long-lasting. 
Where, then, should we place the national government in all this? The cliché of the 
nineteenth-century “night watchman” state, if at all helpful, underestimates the role of the 
state within the whole system. First of all, the state contributed to the costs of helping 
abandoned children as well as the deaf-mute, unfortunates who could not be blamed for their 
own situation and for which the local authorities could not be expected to take all 
responsibility. More common still was that the state supplied extraordinary subsidies for 
covering expenses of starting up, renovating or purchasing materials and equipment. This way 
the government subsidized psychiatric institutions, training workshops and industrial schools. 
Though it is difficult to distinguish the different categories and to retrieve the allocations 
figuring in the budgets, around 1860, these expenses roughly amounted to BEF 250,000, or 
about 2 per cent of the Ministry of Justice’s budget (Parliamentary Documents 1863). 
The way in which national government influenced the poor relief system’s financial 
foundations most strongly, however, was through national legislation. Poor relief depended 
mainly on two financing sources: public funds and private charity. The Commissions and 
Welfare Offices often administered a collection of immovable goods confiscated during the 
French period. The revenues these goods produced provided them with the necessary means 
to fulfil their legal task. In the event of insufficient funds, the law prescribed that the local 
authorities must cover the deficit. On the other hand, the network of care institutions was 
maintained largely because rich benefactors founded or supported institutions.  
However, it was not that there was a public sector funded by public funds and a private sector 
funded by private charity; public and private were essentially intertwined. Some private 
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institutions received direct government subsidies, while others could expand their private 
services as a result of a steady income from placements reimbursed by the local authorities or 
the Welfare Office. In turn, local aristocrats made gifts or bequests to the local Commission or 
Welfare Office. In a statistical report on charitable institutions, the Ministry of Justice 
remarked that “the sentiment of charity … inspires frequent gifts in favour of the public 
charitable institutions” (Lentz 1866: 22). In the first two decades of Belgian independence, 
between 1831 and 1850, the public system received more than BEF 18,000,000 from gifts and 
bequests, and in the following decade alone this amounted to more than BEF 22,000,000. 
Thus, even the financial foundations of the system reflected its mixed character. 
The impact of national legislation would become particularly apparent when “culture wars” 
between Catholics and liberals from the late 1850s onwards started to affect poor relief’s 
financial foundations. The quick succession of events since the French Revolution had 
resulted in a complex set of different legal codes, ranging from the Civil Code to Dutch 
decrees, providing a regulatory framework. For example, religious institutes working in 
public hospitals needed official recognition by royal decree, which also set a limit to the 
number of nurses they were allowed to employ in the hospital. The first Belgian cabinets, 
fond of inviting private, religious charity into the public system, were lenient in putting into 
practice these regulations and gave free rein to private charity. Private donors were allowed to 
establish their own “foundations” or to appoint someone of their choice to administer their 
gifts or bequests. Increasingly secular liberals noticed grudgingly how the Church used such 
constructions to support existing and found new Catholic hospitals (run by religious 
institutes), thus firmly re-establishing the social influence they had lost with the French 
revolution. 
The first liberal-only government taking power in 1847 altered course radically, stating that 
Catholic policy had led to “a bunch of private institutions, not in any way linked to the public 
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administration, pretending to enjoy legal rights and hiding from every legal control” (Recueil 
1850: 282). In 1857, a moderate Catholic government made an ultimate attempt to settle the 
question by granting all charitable institutions limited legal personality, to the great 
indignation of the liberal opposition, whose street protests against what they called the “law of 
the convents” caused the government to resign. In spite of several critical verdicts by different 
courts, the new liberal government put an end to the possibility of administering own 
foundations in new legislation in 1859 and 1864. Donors and their preferred beneficiaries 
resorted to semi-legal alternatives rather than making use of the legal system. In many cases, 
religious institutes made use of a “straw man” who owned in their place. It was only in the 
1920s that the issue  was eventually settled. In the meantime, the mixed landscape of the 
public poor relief system remained essentially the same, with minor revisions of legislation de 
facto institutionalizing some aspects (for example the “placement” procedure). 
2.2. Mutual-aid societies and social insurance: “subsidized liberty” and the origins of 
the Belgian welfare state (1850-1920) 
When in the late 1840s Belgium was hit by a major economic and agricultural crisis that also 
fostered social unrest, the national government considered the spreading of the self-help and 
mutual-aid ideas to be the most productive countermeasures. Already in 1848, the parliament 
agreed to the extra expenses of BEF 200,000 “to foster the establishment of provident funds 
in favour of the working class,” of which BEF 30,000 was aimed at granting a limited subsidy 
by means of encouragement to both existing and newly-found mutual-aid societies, which 
typically covered loss of income due to sickness for members paying monthly fees (Pasinomie 
1849: 146, 1850: 294). In the meantime, the government had prepared a bill that would follow 
these temporary measures, resulting in the Mutual-Aid Societies Act of 1851, which 
encouraged associations to apply for legal recognition in exchange for a number of limited 
financial advantages such as exemption from stamp tax (Pasinomie 1851: 73-79).  
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While it is true that the government seemed wary of revolutionary activities hidden under the 
cloak of mutual-aid societies (Rezsohazy 1957: 71), the bill was seen as interventionist 
enough by contemporaries, perfectly reflecting the premises also underlying the poor relief 
system. A set of strict conditions had to be met by the associations, legal recognition had to be 
approved by royal decree, a Permanent Commission was installed to follow up on the matter 
and report back to the government, and the Ministry of the Interior gave triennial prizes to the 
financially most well-organized societies (Rapport 1851). A year previously, the government 
had also established a state-run annuity funds (merged in 1865 with a state-run savings banks 
and since known as the ASLK), hoping that workers would affiliate to build up some savings 
as a pension (Companje et al. 2009). This role of the state harmonized perfectly with the 
prevalent discourse: “A government,” a parliamentary report stated, “cannot do everything, as 
some reformers would have it, but … is not at all condemned to do nothing either, as some try 
to sustain, [it] can play an honourable part [and] can stimulate, encourage and support a whole 
lot of institutions” (Parliamentary documents 1851: 1). Far from being limited to Belgian 
politics, this discourse circulated in the transnational space of social reform among bourgeois 
elites rallying around a conservative social reformism typically formulated at international 
congresses, as an alternative to revolutionary sentiments (Leonards and Randeraad 2010). 
Though the Ministers of Justice and the Interior hoped and expected an increase in mutual-aid 
societies, the years that followed made abundantly clear that the 1851 Act had in fact a very 
meagre impact. The Permanent Commission’s president had to admit in 1856 that the 
financial advantages “had not seemed considerable enough to make a great number of 
associations profit” (Visschers 1857: 18). Apart from the financial advantages stipulated in 
the 1851 Act, the national government only provided limited start-up subsidies for societies 
(never more than BEF 150 each) and premiums for the award-winning associations. Only 
after 1886 did the number of recognized mutual-aid societies start to grow exponentially. In 
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the spring of 1886 heavy strikes in the coal basins of Liège, followed by brutal actions of the 
police and the army, had sparked an unforeseen outburst of social unrest, making the Catholic 
government recognize the gravity of the situation. It was the start of an unprecedented growth 
of new legally recognized (often Catholic) associations. While at the end of 1885 still only 
207 such associations existed, this number had already increased fivefold by the spring of 
1897 (Revue du Travail 1897). 
The exponential increase of mutual-aid societies in the late 1880s and the public demand for 
legal reform after 1886 paved the way for more state intervention, but only with the Catholic 
government pulling the strings. Following the report of the newly-installed Labour 
Commission, a system of provincial and regional committees was set up, through which the 
provinces from then on annually distributed BEF 23,000 of subsidies (Pasinomie 1887, Du 
Sart de Bouland 1890). However, both the Labour Commission and the Permanent 
Commission emphasized the need for a new law modifying that of 1851 (Commission du 
Travail 1887, Rapport 1890). Not only socialists but also Christian Democrats and many 
Social Catholics admired and hoped to follow the German example of Bismarckian state-
funded insurances. An international gathering of Social Catholics in Liège in 1890 had even 
exerted pressure on the conservative Catholic government by proposing a similar system: 
funded by compulsory contributions of employers and employees, and with public services 
where no mutual-aid society existed (Van Meulder 1997). 
Significantly disregarding the advice of their own party members at the Liège congress, the 
Catholic cabinet did not set course for a Bismarckian-like social insurance system, on the 
contrary. The Catholic government was determined not so much to expand social policy but to 
expand it in ways that strengthened their own institutions. Catholics had only regained control 
over national government in 1884, after liberals had tried to secularize and centralize 
education during the so-called “school war” between 1879 and 1884. Seeing this as an attempt 
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to abolish their influence in local schools (both private and public) and as a frightening 
example of institution-building by the state, Catholics opted to build and strengthen their own 
private network of institutions. They thus anticipated losing government power and being left 
with empty hands when adversaries would simply reverse their government policy. Socialists, 
too, increasingly emerged as a powerful adversary, with the establishment of their political 
party in 1885, their appearance in parliament, and, not unimportantly, a growing socialist 
labour movement.   
The new Mutual-Aid Societies Act of 1894 did nothing more than remove the most important 
obstacles from the 1851 Act and expand the advantages of legal recognition. Not a single 
word was mentioned on the conditions or the apportioning of state subsidies, which hence 
continued to be remunerated not under the law, but by ministerial decrees issued by the 
administration (Pasinomie 1894). The 1894 Act was significantly modified in 1898, which 
stated in no uncertain terms that only recognized associations would from now on qualify for 
any governmental subsidies. In doing so, the Catholic government not only tried to force 
socialist associations to apply for recognition but also attempted to get control over the more 
than BEF 130,000 of provincial subsidies annually accorded in 1897, at the same time 
overruling liberal or socialist provinces such as Hainaut or Antwerp that were still supporting 
non-recognized socialist associations (Rapport 1897, Van Meulder 1997). The same argument 
was more clearly expressed in a report of the Senate (Parliamentary documents 1912: 3) 
stating that “it seemed essential to not let the local governments by the apportionment of their 
subsidies paralyze the measures of precaution and control adopted by the state.”  
With the new laws on mutual aid the Catholic government decisively set course for a system 
of “subsidized liberty” (liberté subsidiée): private societies enjoying legal recognition 
provided social insurance on a voluntary basis, but the government held a firm grip by 
granting a wide range of subsidies. Separate bills on old-age pensions and invalidity 
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insurance, adding to the steady stream of legislation, followed the same underlying principles. 
From 1891, the government encouraged societies that provided old-age pension schemes for 
their members through an account with the General Annuity Funds, as the government’s hope 
in 1850 that workers would affiliate themselves had turned out to be a complete failure 
(Rapport 1893: 44-48). These expenses included personal incentive bonuses as well as 
subsidies for mutual-aid societies acting as intermediary (Rezsohazy 1957). They steadily 
grew from BEF 13,500 in 1891 to no less than BEF 250,000 in 1899 and were confirmed by a 
new law on old-age pensions in 1900. Besides the extra subsidy for the society, individuals 
were also encouraged to affiliate through a mutual-aid society because the law made the same 
deposit much more profitable through an intermediary than direct affiliation (Clement 1999). 
Its policy on the invalidity insurance was in many ways characteristic for the Catholic 
government’s power politics. In the 1894 Act the government had already stimulated the 
establishment of federations, which covered the difficulties their affiliated societies could not 
solve on their own, such as reinsurance for long-time invalidity (granting benefits beyond the 
usual six-month period granted by a health insurance). From 1903 onwards, special grants (up 
to BEF 150,000 in 1904) were issued quietly by royal decree (Rapport 1906). These royal 
decrees were apparently not published in the official bulletin as was usual and mandatory, and 
were reportedly used exclusively in favour of Catholic federations. Only years later in the 
parliamentary discussion of a new law on federations, socialist representatives denounced 
these abuses. One of them aptly summarized the government policy of administrative and 
ministerial action as “leaving to the executive power represented by the Ministry of Labour 
the exclusive care of regulating state intervention regarding subsidies and other advantages, 
following the pleasure of the minister.” (Parliamentary proceedings 1912: 1024) The 
regulations regarding the criteria for subsidies for invalidity insurance that the Minister of 
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Labour had drawn up in an official circular only in 1906 were eventually enacted in 1912. 
This 1912 law addressed a wide array of subsidies for federations (Barnich 1911). 
On the eve of the First World War, social provision had not only undergone a major 
transformation, but it had also expanded enormously. Almost half a million workers were 
affiliated with about 4,000 mutual-aid societies (Companje et al. 2009). By 1914, the Ministry 
of Labour budgeted sums of almost BEF 1,000,000 for subsidies to mutual-aid societies and 
federations, and of BEF 1,600,000 for subsidies to societies responsible for old-age pensions 
(Parliamentary documents 1913). But the direct pension contributions of the state, established 
since the 1900 Pension Act, represented with BEF 17,840,000 the biggest slice of the budget 
by far. Together these posts made up no less than 75 per cent of the Ministry’s entire budget.  
If the outbreak of the First World War hadn’t thrown a spanner in the works, Belgium might 
even have had its own law on compulsory social insurance in 1914 (Companje et al. 2009). 
The conservative Catholic government had always resisted compulsion, even when 
progressive Christian Democrats had made their appearance in the Catholic government in 
1907. After enduring debates with socialists presenting their own statist proposal, the 
government passed a bill by large majority of votes in the Chamber of Representatives in the 
spring of 1914 which only needed to be confirmed by the – reluctant – Senate. The 
compulsory social insurance system included did not, however, imply a break with the system 
of subsidized liberty, to the very frustration of socialist and liberal politicians who favoured 
instead the establishment of a neutral public service. The compulsory social insurance did not 
come into being until after the Second World War. 
3. Explaining the continuity and change in Belgian social policies: ideology and power 
How, then, can we explain that the social insurance policy emerging around the turn of the 
twentieth century, though reflecting a new sort of social policy, mirrored at least the way in 
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which poor relief had long been organized – that is, by private providers in close cooperation 
with the government? Indeed, the continuity is all the more remarkable when taking into 
account the drastically changing social and political context around the turn of the century, 
with ongoing industrialization, tentative democratization, emerging labour and socialist 
movements, and not in the least the expanding role of the state. Essentially, many 
explanations for the continuity between the poor relief and social insurance system have some 
connection to the concepts of ideology and power.  
3.1. Ideology… 
The most fundamental continuity lay in the ongoing conflicting visions on social policy: one 
that saw modern government, especially the state, as responsible for regulation and execution 
of social policy versus one that accepted the state only as the ultimate regulator, and not 
provider, of an organic field of social policy providers grown from below. During the 
nineteenth century, this conflict led to the well-known “culture wars” between secular liberals 
and Catholics. Liberal governments interpreted the existing legislation to their will and used 
their administrative power to press home their arguments. After 1884, the Catholic 
governments did the same in their political fight against the socialist movement. The Catholic 
government greatly feared the loss of their power and by building a network of intermediary 
organizations hoped to anticipate such a calamity. Of huge importance in fuelling these 
dynamics of power politics was how conservative Catholics perceived the socialist threat and 
how heavy rhetoric in the socialist discourse, rather than their all in all reformist practice, 
only strengthened the image, and thus their determination in their policy. These and other 
ideational factors in social policy change have also been put to the front in more recent cases 
of social policy change (Béland and Waddan 2012). As a result, the system of social 
insurances on the eve of the First World War did not in any way resemble the state-led, 
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centralized and compulsory system the socialists favoured but to the contrary a system of 
voluntary provision organized by local and regional societies and subsidized by the state.  
The Catholic government’s abhorrence of the socialist ideal of a centralized state policy, just 
as its abhorrence of the liberal ideal of a strong secular state, was of course also prompted by 
ideological motivations. The fear of an all-encompassing and overpowering state absorbing 
civil society (and, of course, the Church) was never far away. Around 1850, Belgian Catholics 
shared this concern with moderate unionist liberals. Their preference for the mixed 
private/public poor relief system was underpinned by a transnational discourse of 
conservative social reformism, widely shared and typically heard at international congresses. 
Gradually, Catholics started to develop corporatism as an answer to the social challenges and 
the equally-resented ‘extremist’ alternatives of liberalism and socialism. Not only the 
conservative Catholic governments after 1884, but also the Social Catholics and Christian 
Democrats thus attached great importance to the intermediary role played by mutual-aid 
societies and federations. The individual, weak in his isolation, should be able to resort to 
social relations and association to protect him from the absorbing power of the state. Just as 
private charitable institutions and voluntary associations, “the important role that mutualist 
associations have to fulfil in our modern society” was therefore stressed (Rapport 1897: 4). 
Even those among Catholics who favoured state intervention emphasized the need to respect 
the existing initiatives originating from society only by supplementing rather than replacing 
them. State intervention had to meet a need of some kind, a need caused by the insufficient, 
inadequate or non-existent provision of private or social actors. If early advocates favoured 
corporatism as a romantic ideal against any state interference, corporatism gradually came to 
include a measured and moderate form of state intervention. Thus, the discourse that 
underpinned the Catholic preference for “subsidized liberty” later became known as the 
subsidiarity principle, first coined in the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in 1931. 
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3.2. … and power 
There was a remarkable twist around the apparent Catholic abhorrence of statist policy that 
shows how ideology could be set aside by sheer power political reasoning. In principle, 
Catholics had always favoured decentralized government and local autonomy, understandably 
affected by the opposition against and abolishment of the Church’s influence of successive 
absolutist governments. During their era in power, liberal cabinets used their power in smart 
ways to outflank parliamentary debate or resistance from lower levels; it was part of the 
nineteenth-century political culture of majority cabinets, ministerial autonomy and power 
politics shared by the two parties. Adding to this the traditionally liberal power in the cities, 
Catholics during this era had expected much from the provincial authorities to defend their 
interests. But by the end of the century, things had taken a turn. It was now Catholics who 
held firm power on the national level, and the socialist threat was coming from the provincial 
authorities (for instance in Liège and Hainaut) and from the cities. Provincial authorities were 
undermining Catholic national policy by subsidizing non-recognized socialists mutual-aid 
societies. Despite their discourse against an overly powerful state, Catholics succeeded in 
centralizing the decision-making on subsidies. Ironically, Catholics thus used their power to 
avoid state provision or state insurances (in favour of non-state provision), but at the same 
time took power away from the local and provincial authorities in favour of the national 
government. So, put differently, centralization (but not statism) was allowed if it could 
strengthen political power. The complex multilevel governance in Belgium was thus not only 
an aspect of the contextual changes but also one of the tools used by political actors.  
That social policy was realized in close cooperation with a field of voluntary associations was 
the result of a deliberate government policy pursued by means of a wide range of 
governmental support strategies. This was as true for the local system of poor relief and health 
care as it was for the system of social insurance, for the liberal as well as for the Catholic 
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party, and for the national as well as the local level. Just as local authorities cooperated with 
private partners in ways varying greatly from case to case, the state made use of subsidies 
with having its mind on a certain goal. For instance, to help the mutual-aid societies keep their 
administration in order and found it on a scientific mutualist methodology, the national 
government first only awarded prizes for the best-run societies, then later also gave them 
subsidies to double-check the accounts, and finally even paid for a permanent secretariat 
including a secretary on its own payroll. The growing dependence on state subsidies provided 
the government with the opportunity not only to stimulate new forms of services but also to 
impose standards of quality such as minimum benefits for the existing services. But this 
would not remain one-way traffic. Thanks to its campaign of stimulating federations the 
government contributed to the emergence of national alliances of the Catholic, neutral, 
socialist, liberal and factory-related mutual-aid societies, which obtained legal recognition in 
1906, 1908, 1913, 1914 and 1920, respectively (Companje et al. 2009). Acting as the 
exponents of their respective movements they gradually gained power in decision-making. 
Not only did they influence the positions of their respective political parties from within, but 
they also became important stakeholders in government circles, to be taken into account when 
outlining social policy.  
This clearly involved the same “interplay of political institutions, interest groups and public 
opinion” that Morgan and Campbell (2011: 219) also identified in the development of the 
“delegated” welfare state in the US. There is, however, a slight but meaningful difference 
between the delegated governance that now characterizes the US and the sort of mixed 
private/public forms historically prominent in Belgium. As the name of the concept indicates, 
“delegated governance” is about government delegating a certain responsibility to non-state 
providers in order to make it more defensible to public opinion and vested interests. While the 
eventual outcome may be little different, historically in cases such as Belgium this mixed 
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private/public intertwinement had grown the other way round. Private nonprofit initiatives 
preceded government action, with government and especially the state only taking action in 
the event of insufficient provision. 
Conclusion 
The remnants of this historical example of social policy by other means remain visible even in 
the Belgian welfare state today. Private hospitals, often part of a national Christian alliance, 
still make out a big part of the health care system and mutual-aid societies are still responsible 
for the execution of insurances against sickness and invalidity. However, this continuity is not 
static, and historicism is not nostalgia. One should be able to say that policies which are now 
labelled social policy by other means were more conventional in their own period of time, that 
these policies reflected the then prevailing views on what social policy was and how it had to 
be put into practice, and that it is fundamentally unhistorical to weigh nineteenth-century 
social policy against the welfare state of today; without necessarily seeming to imply or 
unwillingly give credit to the glorification of those systems, inspired by political motivations.  
The main conclusion is that, if Belgium with its system of “subsidized liberty” today is a 
welfare state with accents of non-state provision, this can be traced back to nineteenth-century 
social policy. An improved understanding of the nineteenth century as a key period in the 
formation of the current welfare state prevents us from accepting either a belief in an 
exaggerated discontinuity between poor relief systems and social insurance systems, or in a 
too-linear evolution from “traditional” to “modern” systems of social policy, and also defies 
any caricatural image of the same nineteenth-century state as a mere “night watchman”. It 
contributes not only to the “explanatory integration” (Hacker 2005: 128) of why the modern 
welfare state has taken its specific shape, it also establishes that social policy by other means 
is part of the historical development of the welfare state. Indeed, the power politics resulting 
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from the nineteenth-century “culture war” between the modern state and the Church, between 
radical liberals and intransigent Catholics, paved the way for a welfare state that was not 
conceived as a centralist state monopoly but on the contrary was given shape by and executed 
through an expanding network of social movements and organizations.  
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